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"RIGHTING," RESTRUCTURING, AND REJUVENATING
THE POSTCOLONIAL AFRICAN STATE: THE CASE FOR
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN AU SPECIAL COMMISSION
ON NATIONAL MINORITIES
Obiora Chinedu Okafor*
1. Introduction
The special theme of this volume of the Yearbook, i.e. "Reflections
on Some Forms of Statehood in Africa," invites contributor and reader
alike to grapple with an abstract concept that has nevertheless proved
to be highly consequential to the lived experience of virtually every
African - at least since the mid-nineteenth century. Despite the
increasingly extensive literature on the subject,1 both within and
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Statehood" (1985) 23 The Journal of Modern African Studies 575; Zolberg
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without the legal academe, the topic is so complex, so controversial,
so socially relevant, and so widely misunderstood still, that it does
deserve further attention in a Yearbook such as this.
The objective of this article is to contribute in a modest way to the
process of producing ever more accurate scholarly and policy
understanding with regard to this very complicated socio-legal
subject. To this end, the article will develop systematically
an analytical case for the establishment of an African Union (AU)
Special Commission on National Minorities as a way of beginning a
viable process of resolving the national minority problem that
underlies the structural legitimacy crisis that has afflicted
the postcolonial African state from its very beginning as the successor
of the colonial African state. In order to make this case, the article has
been divided into five sections, including this introduction.
In section 2, the nature of the national minority problem within the
postcolonial African state is explicated. In section 3, the normative
imperative of rejuvenating the postcolonial African state through its
righting2 and restructuring is discussed. Thereafter, section 4 develops
- in as full a fashion as space allows - a case for the establishment of
a particular kind of inter-African institution, i.e. the Special
Commission on National Minorities, to facilitate and bolster the
normatively imperative process of righting, restructuring - and
therefore rejuvenating, the postcolonial African state. Section 5
concludes the article.
At the outset, it must be noted that the argument that is made in this
article in favour of the establishment of a new institution that can
make an important contribution to the peaceable management of the
state legitimacy crisis that afflicts the postcolonial African state and
which has almost completely crippled a few such states, is not in any
way a suggestion that the postcolonial African state should be
reconstituted in its present form with the help of this proposed
institution. If anything, it is an argument that this state should be
2 1 have borrowed the term "righting" from the work of Karen Knop. See Knop
(K.), "The 'Righting' of Recognition: Recognition of States in Eastern Europe
and the Soviet Union" in Le Bouthillier (Y.), McRae (D.M.) and Pharand (D.)
(eds.), Selected Papers in International Law: The Contribution of the Canadian
Council on International Law (The Hague: Kluwer, 1999) at 261.
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reconfigured peaceably through a process that is framed by
international human rights law and ordered in part by a process that is
created by this institution, lest that state continue to be reconfigured in
as conflict-ridden and violent a way as it so far has, at least for the
most part. 3 Surely, even when ideally operated - which has not been
the case - the current structure of the postcolonial African state cannot
be the only viable way of configuring statehood in Africa?
Another caveat that must be entered at the outset is that the author's
cautious faith in the value-added of the institution the establishment of
which is proposed in this article does not imply the promotion of the
uncritical reliance on international institutions and procedures as
panaceas. The pitfalls of such an approach are well documented.4
What the author's cautious confidence in the capacity of such an
institution to make a difference does imply, however, is a limited faith
in such institutions as resources in the hands of the human agents
(such as local activists, the leadership of minority groups, and even
diplomats). Viewed as resources, our expectations regarding the
possible achievements of these institutions will become more limited,
and therefore more realistic and accurate.
Needless to say, this article - especially its first two substantive
sections - draws from some of my previous work in this general area.
However, the article seeks to add value to the debate on statehood in
Africa not just by deploying to the current terrain of enquiry important
insights from that previous work, but also by offering a fresh
perspective on some of the arguments in support of my earlier
proposals for the establishment, within the structures of the defunct
Organization of African Unity (OAU),5 of a Special Commission on
See Mutua (M.), "Putting Humpty Dumpty Back Together Again: The Dilemmas
of the Post-Colonial African State" (1995) 21 Brooklyn Journal of International
Law 505, at 536.
4 For example, see Kennedy (D.), "A New World Order: Yesterday, Today and
Tomorrow" (1994) 4 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 329, at
339-357; and Kennedy (D.), "The Move to Institutions" (1987) 8 Cardozo Law
Review 841.
5 Pursuant to the adoption of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, on-line:
(http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/AboutAu/Constitutive Act en.htm)
(visited 24 May 2006), on 1 July 2000, the OAU was formally dissolved in 2002
and replaced by the AU. See also Decision of the Assembly of Heads of State of
the African Union, OAU Doc. AHG/AU/AEC/Dec. (I) (9-10 July 2002). On this
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National Minorities.6 The other important way in which value is
added to the relevant body of literature by this article is through its
further development, within the more contemporary context of the
new African Union,7 of my previously offered argument for the
creation of this institution.
2. The National Minorities Problem within the Postcolonial
African State
It is hardly controversial to argue that the relationship between
almost all postcolonial African states and the national minorities who
form the bulk of the sub-state groups that constitute nearly every one
of these states has, to say the least, been highly problematic. Less well
recognized in the literature is the fact that this problematic situation
has been, and will for the foreseeable future remain, the central
problem of post-colonial African statecraft.8 Nevertheless, most
observers of African politics would agree that as the Constitutive Act
of the African Union has itself declared "the scourge of conflicts in
Africa constitutes a major impediment to the socio-economic
development of the continent." 9 Yet, since nearly every single one of
these conflicts in Africa has quite remarkably been internal, or better
still intra-state in nature, 10 and since virtually all of these intra-state
conflicts have involved tensions over the practical enjoyment (or the
and similar issues, see Udombana (N.J.), "The Unfinished Business: Conflicts,
the African Union and the New Partnership for Africa's Development" (2003) 35
George Washington University International Law Review 55, at 55-56
(hereinafter "Unfinished Business")..
6 See Okafor (O.C.), "Re-Defining", supra note 1 at 183-192. See also Okafor
(O.C.), "The African System on Human and Peoples' Rights, Quasi-
Constructivism, and the Possibility of Peacebuilding within African States"
(2004) 8 International Journal of Human Rights 413 at 443; and Okafor (O.C.),
"Convention Refugeehood, Early Warning Signs, and the Structural Crisis of
Legitimate Statehood in Contemporary Nigeria" (2003) 9 Buffalo Human Rights
Law Review I at 6.
7 See the Constitutive Act of the African Union, supra note 4.
8 See Okafor (O.C.), "After Martyrdom: International Law, Sub-State Groups, and
the Construction of Legitimate Statehood in Africa" (2000) 41 Harvard
International Law Journal 503 (hereinafter "Martyrdom").
9 See the Preamble of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, supra note 4.10 See Udombana (N.J.), "Unfinished Business", supra note 4 at 59.
Establishment of an A U Special Commission on National Minorities 47
lack thereof) of group rights/interests within the relevant states, it
appears that inter-group conflicts (mostly of the majority/minority
type) have at the very least been one major impediment to the
effectiveness of the postcolonial African state. What is more, based on
my own careful observation of the dynamics of the politics of state
formation in Africa, I am of the view that the seemingly incessant
inter-group tensions that underlie almost all of the intra-state conflicts
that occur within the postcolonial African state is - at least in terms of
its scale, prevalence and consequences - the key African state-
building problem of our time. This point is easily illustrated.
Throughout its postcolonial history, and even before,
the postcolonial African state has been typically beset by inter-group
tensions, crises, and violence. As Makau Mutua has brilliantly argued,
viewed from the perspective of the desirability of generally cohesive
or widely accepted states with a reasonable chance of attaining
effectiveness, the postcolonial African state never really had a chance
in the first place. 11 A brief review of a sample of such states will serve
to illustrate the nature of the structural illegitimacy that has seriously
threatened the viability of the postcolonial African state. In the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (i.e. the former Zaire), "multiple
secessions and inter-ethnic conflict followed [its] independence" from
Belgium in 1960.12 Chief among these tensions and conflicts was the
secessionist rebellion of the people of the Katanga (later Shaba)
area.' 3 That some, if not all, of these tensions and conflicts have
survived to this day, mostly via their exacerbation, manipulation and
reification by certain political leaders is in part ably illustrated by the
minority rights and secession claims made before the African
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights in the now famous and
relatively recent Katanga Case. 14 In Rwanda, longstanding tensions,
conflicts, and violence between the Hutu numerical majority and Tutsi
minority eventually escalated into one of the most well-known
"' See Mutua (M.), supra note 2.
12 See McNulty (M.), "The Collapse of Zaire: Implosion, Revolution or External
Sabotage?" (1999) 37 The Journal of Modern African Studies 53, at 54.
13 Ibid. at 62.
14 See Katangese Peoples' Congress v. Zaire (1996) 3 International Human Rights
Reports 136.
48 Obiora Chinedu Okafor
genocidal episodes in human history. 15 While, Rwandan society has to
some extent begun the long process of recovery and reconciliation,
there is as yet no reliable evidence that the underlying tensions that led
to the genocide have fully died down. The conflict in Burundi, which
has lasted some ten years and killed well over two hundred thousand
people and has, in Udombana's fitting words, left that country
"paralyzed", is similarly based on structural tensions between a fearful
but powerful Tutsi minority and a less powerful but far more populous
Hutu majority. 16 While this conflict is now formally over, there is
little evidence to suggest that the inter-group resentment and tensions
that spawned it are no longer prevalent, even if in a slightly milder
form. In Nigeria, the recent upsurge in violence in the oil-rich Niger
Delta region, instigated for the most part by the militant wings of the
various minority rights movements that populate that area, only
underlines the intensity of much inter-group tensions in Africa's
vastly most populous country.1 7 The Biafran war that was fought
mostly in the Igbo-dominated Eastern region of Nigeria in the late
1960s is perhaps the most negative consequence so far of this sort of
intense tension. 18 Just as the decades old inter-group conflict in
the Sudan between the somewhat "Arabized" North and the
"non-Arabized" South waned and ended in a peace deal, a similarly
destructive inter-group conflict broke out in the Darfur region of that
same country.19 While a peace deal was signed in mid-2006 by some
of the sides to the Darfur conflict (the central regime in Khartoum
included), there is little room for so optimistic an assessment that
would declare most inter-group tensions "dead and buried" in that vast
15 See Hintjens (H.M.), "Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda" (1999)
37 The Journal of Modern African Studies 241.
16 See Udombana (N.J.), "Unfinished Business" supra note 4 at 61-62.
17 See Human Rights Watch, They Do Not Own This Place:
Government Discrimination Against 'Non-Indigenes' in Nigeria
(New York, Human Rights Watch, 2006) at 7-8; "Militants Kill 4 Policemen in
Port Harcourt" Thisday, 15 May 2006, on-line:
(http://www.thisdayonline.com/nview.php?id+48166&printerfriendly= 1)
(visited 15 May 2006).
18 See Forsyth (F.), The Dogs of War (New York: Viking Press, 1974).
19 See Human Rights Watch, Darfur: Humanitarian Aid under Siege (New York:
Human Rights Watch, 2006) at 6.
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but deeply troubled country. 20 More generally, Joel Ngugi was correct
when he noted that Africa's "indigenous peoples" (who are almost
always also minority groups) have been subjected to very serious
ill-treatment that has too often generated high tension, conflict and
violence.2' While the foregoing is by no means a comprehensive
rendering of the inter-group tensions and conflicts that afflict the
post-colonial African state, it suffices to illustrate the centrality of
such tensions and conflicts to statecraft in Africa, as well as its status
22
as the key challenge of contemporary African state-building praxis.
It is important, however, to note, as I have shown elsewhere, that
contrary to the conventional wisdom, this tendency to be characterized
by tensions, crisis and violence - one which has marked and marred
the history of the postcolonial African state - is not uniquely African
and has less to do with the much touted incapacity of Africans to
govern themselves or to build large and effective centralized states
than with the daunting challenges of state-building posed by the
particular character of the state-formation processes that produced the
postcolonial African state as we currently know it.
23
Thus, the serious national minority problems that face the
postcolonial African state are mostly structural in nature.24 This does
not of course discount the role of human agency in the generation of
these problems. The structural nature of this problem stems for the
most part from the structural illegitimacy of almost all such states in
Africa. 25 In the main, such illegitimacy has derived from the
postcolonial African state's lack of sufficient affinity with its
constituent sub-state groups, and its origins as a generally unalloyed
external imposition rather than as a largely organic entity created
20 The Guardian (Nigeria), 17 May 2006.
21 See Ngugi (J.), "The Decolonization-Modernization Interface and the Plight of
Indigenous Peoples in Post-Colonial Development Discourse in Africa" (2002)
20 Wisconsin International Law Journal 297.
22 For other examples, see Jinadu (L.A.), "Explaining and Managing Ethnic
Conflict in Africa: Towards a Cultural Theory of Democracy," Lecture
Delivered at the Uppsala University Forum for International and Area Studies,
5 February 2004 (on file with the author).
23 See Okafor (O.C.), "Martyrdom," supra note 7 at 504.
24 Ibid., at 504-514.
25 Ibid., at 504.
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through an internal process of consensus-building. 2 6 And although all
states are a product of conflict, consensus and contrivance, it must be
remembered that the postcolonial African state is by far the most
contrived of all!
3. "Righting", Restructuring and Rejuvenating the Postcolonial
African State:
I have argued in my previous work that certain doctrinal tendencies
of international law (such as the facilitation of homogenization27 and
peer-review28) have traditionally facilitated the process via which the
postcolonial African state has tended to coercively retain its restive
sub-state groups, almost always with profoundly negative implications
for the legitimacy, stability, peacefulness, and effectiveness of the
relevant states. 29 Given the deep socio-cultural cleavages and serious
structural tensions that characterize the postcolonial African state, this
conflictual and often violent result is not all that surprising.
30
However, as I have also shown elsewhere, international law is in
many senses slowly beginning to turn slightly in the direction of
alternative doctrines and tendencies, such as autonomy3 1 (rather than
homogenization) and infra-review32 (instead of peer-review). This
26 Ibid.
27 As used here, "homogenization" refers to the tendency in international law
to facilitate the largely coercive attempts by states to "form cohesive,
culturally unitary nations out of their distinct, diverse component polities."
See ibid., at 518.
28 As used here, "peer review" refers to the tendency in international law to
facilitate "the process of determining state legitimacy... according to the ipse
dixit or "say so" of pre-existing states. This determination is not necessarily
made with reference to the nature or qualities of the would-be state, or of any of
its constituent sub-state groups." See ibid., at 515.
29 See Okafor (O.C.), "Re-Defining" supra note 1 at 53-77.
30 See Okafor (O.C.), "Martyrdom" supra note 7 at 505 and 521-526.
3 As used here, the term "autonomy" refers to the slight turn in favour of more
respect in international law and society for the rights, desires and wishes of the
sub-state socio-cultural groups that constitute most states (especially for their
minority and self-determination rights). See ibid., at 520-521.
32 As used here, the term "infra-review" refers to the requirement that the decision-
making process regarding state legitimacy pay significant attention to the "say-
so" and rights of the socio-cultural groups that constitute a given state. See ibid.,
at 515.
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turn may allow international law and institutions to avoid contributing
in nearly as much measure to the generation of tensions and violence
within the post-colonial African state.33
As these linkages among these specific traditional doctrines and
tendencies of international law, the structural illegitimacy of the
postcolonial African state, and the generation of conflict within many
such states, have already been well explicated in other books and
articles, I will not dwell of them here. 34 Rather, what I propose to do
briefly in this section is to show how the international legal regime
(and to a much lesser extent, certain domestic regimes within African
states) have begun to contribute to the righting, restructuring - and
therefore to the eventual rejuvenation - of the post-colonial African
state. The promotion and sustenance of these righting and
restructuring tendencies is seen as key to countering the negative
effects that the homogenization and peer-review tendencies have had
on the postcolonial African state, and in also facilitating the
incipient - if still shaky - turn toward the relatively more desirable
autonomy and infra-review tendencies.
Righting the Postcolonial African State
The need to "right" the postcolonial African state refers primarily
to the international legal imperative of utilizing and adhering
to international human rights law norms (especially those relating
to self-determination and minority rights) in the processes of
state-formation or even state-disintegration in Africa (as elsewhere).
The use of the term "righting" also refers to a normative standard;
i.e. it suggests that adherence to these minority rights and
self-determination norms is in fact the right thing to do from a policy
and moral perspective. As obvious as the necessity of adherence to
such norms in statecraft may seem to some, international law has until
recently tended to favour, rather than counter, attitudes that detracted
from the observance of the requirements of these norms. As we have
seen, the law has tended to favour the coercive retention of sub-state
" Ibid., at 517-518 and 520-521.
34 For example, see Okafor (O.C.), "Re-Defining" supra note 1; and Okafor (O.C.),
"Martyrdom" supra note 7.
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groups within established and generally homogenizing states,
while paying scant attention to the "say so" or infra-review of such
groups regarding the legitimacy of their continued membership within
these established states. These two attitudes (i.e. homogenization and
peer-review) tend to negative rather than adhere to the minority and
self-determination rights that are becoming entrenched in international
law. Thankfully, as strong and dominant as they remain, these
attitudes have begun to wane in significant though still slight
measure.
35
International human rights law, especially articles 1 and 27 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; article 1 of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;
articles 19-23 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights;
and the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National,
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, imposes reasonably clear
obligations on states to respect the rights of their constituent sub-state
groups, especially those who are minorities within those states.
36
It is no secret that most African states have at the formal level
consented to be bound by most of these obligations. These minority
rights include the right of such groups to use their own languages, to
participate fully in political and economic life, to self-determination
(at least in the form of local autonomy), to maintain their
own associations, and to non-discrimination. In particular, the African
Charter, to which every African state, with the sole exception
of Morocco, has adhered, mandates, inter alia, the equality of all the
sub-state groups that constitute each African state,37 outlaws the
"domination of a people by another," 38 guarantees the right of all,, ,,39
peoples to "existence," and "self-determination, guarantees the
35 See also Orentlicher (D.F.), "Separation Anxiety: International Responses to
Ethno-Separatist Claims" (1998) 23 Yale Journal of International Law 1, at 3-4.
36 See the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, 999 UNTS
171; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966,
993 UNTS 3; the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, 1981, (1982)
21 ILM 58; and the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to
National, Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, GA Res. 47/135.
18 December 1992.
37 See article 19.
38 Ibid.
39 See article 20(1).
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right of all peoples to freely control their wealth and natural
resources,40 and clearly states that "colonized or oppressed peoples
shall have the right to free themselves from the bonds of
domination." 4 1 Clearly, these rights, even when they involve self-
determination, apply even within established states such as
postcolonial African states.42 The term "all peoples" has been applied
to the internal context in at least one official interpretation of the
African Charter. And that expression has also been so applied in a
fairly recent Canadian decision. This reading of that term was
rendered in the Katanga Case as well as in the Quebec Reference
Case in Canada.43 What is more, a small number of African states
have begun to include minority rights and the self-determination norm
in their own domestic constitutions, albeit to varying degrees.44
The effect of this application of self-determination and minority
rights to the internal sphere of states is that under contemporary
international law, these states cannot now stand lawfully configured or
in future be re-configured in ways that violate these minority rights
and self-determination norms. Statecraft ought henceforth to be
framed and shaped by the dictates of these norms. Thus, if statehood is
to be "righted" in Africa (both in terms of adherence to the relevant
40 See article 21.
41 See article 20(2).
42 See Umozurike (U.O.), The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1997) 53-54.
43 See Reference Re Secession of Qukbec (1998) 2 S.C.R. 217. See also Okafor
(O.C.), "Entitlement, Process, and Legitimacy in the Emergent International Law
of Secession" (2002) 9 Inter national Journal on Minority and Group Rights 41.
44 See section 235 of the South African Constitution which states that:
"The right of the South African people as a whole to self-determination, as
manifested in this Constitution, does not preclude, within the framework of this
right, recognition of the notion of the right of self-determination of any
community sharing a common cultural and language heritage, within a territorial
entity in the Republic or in any other way, determined by national legislation."
See (http://www.strategicassessments.org/library/resources/SouthAfricaConsti
tution.pdf) (visited 20 May 2006). See also Henrad (K.), Minority Protection in
Post-Apartheid South Africa (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2002) at 116.
And article 39 of the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic
of Ethiopia contains self-determination (up to and including secession rights),
language, cultural and political representation rights for all its
constituent "nations, nationalities and peoples." See
(http://www.ethiopar.net/English/cnstiotn/conchp32.htm) (visited 20 May 2006).
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international law imperatives and in the sense of doing the right thing)
those who lead the processes of state-formation or state-
disaggregation on the African continent must begin to pay far greater
attention to the dictates of the international and African self-
determination and minority rights norms that seek to peaceably order
state-building on the continent.
Yet, as is widely recognized, like statecraft elsewhere, African
statecraft has generally not been as attentive as it ought to be to this
imperative of "righting" the state. For the most past, the postcolonial
African state continues to muddle through and endanger its corporate
future by coercively retaining its constituent groups, and scarcely
attending as adequately as it ought, to the infra-review of its
constituent sub-state groups. This is one good reason to focus, as we
will in the section that follows, on the necessity for the restructuring
of the postcolonial African state along the lines dictated by the same
norms that must guide its righting.
Restructuring the Postcolonial African State
Given that the international legal entitlement of the sub-state
groups that constitute the postcolonial African state to some form of
autonomy, as well as to infra-review of the acceptability to them of
their continued membership within their current states, and given the
intensity of the intra-state conflicts over autonomy and the like that
has been experienced within almost every postcolonial African state,
there appears to be a need to find peaceful ways of restructuring the
state in Africa in order to better satisfy the yearnings of its constituent
peoples. 45 As Makau Mutua has previously, and insightfully, warned
us, confronted as it has always been by an intense structural
legitimacy crisis, the postcolonial African state will be reconfigured
one way or the other, either peaceably or violently.46 The task is to
make that reconfiguration as peaceable as it can be.
45 For another scholar's argument that the righting of statecraft in Africa, via the
application of the African Charter to the area, justifies the restructuring of
African states based on power-sharing arrangements, see Jinadu (L.A.), supra
note 21 at 23.
46 See Mutua (M.), supra note 10 at 536.
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Much as this imperative has been long recognized by other scholars
such as Makau Mutua, African statecraft has yet to come close to an
adequate recognition of this imperative. Indeed, the dominant
tendency is for African states to reject self-determination claims,47
and to view even less consequential minority rights claims with some
suspicion. Far-too-many African states are still configured in highly
centralized and homogenizing ways that allow far too little autonomy
to the socio-cultural groups that constitute them, actually guarantee
too few minority rights to their constituent sub-state groups, and
provide far-too-little real avenues for meaningful infra-review of the
structural legitimacy of the relevant states. Nigerian and Ethiopian
quasi-federalism, 48 and the power-sharing arrangements in Ethiopia
(i.e. special representation in parliament for minorities) and in Nigeria
(as per the federal character principle)49 are some of the mild
exceptions to the generally centralizing trend within the postcolonial
African state. And even many of the relatively few states that have
quite commendably subscribed to federal constitutions and political
arrangements have in practice all but neutralized the autonomy
allowed by such federal arrangements, and have in reality remained
overly centralized. And few, if any, African states brook even the
most harmless discussions about infra-review, fearing that it would
lead to rampant secession (and - as they see it - much chaos).
This tendency to over-centralize and homogenize the postcolonial
African state is, as we have already seen, a major cause of the
structural tensions that lead to conflict and violence on the continent.
That is the chief reason why the state in Africa needs rejuvenation via
its righting and restructuring; not simply to reconstitute it in its
prevailing form, but to re-jiggle its structures in ways that have a
greater chance of earning it the widespread legitimacy of its
constituent peoples.
47 See Ankumah (E.), The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1996) at 163.
48 See Gana (A.T.) and Egwu (S.G.) (eds.), Federalism in Africa: Framing the
National Question (Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World Press, 2003) at 35.
See also Jinadu (L.A.), supra note 21 at 24-30.
49 See Jinadu (L.A.), ibid. at 24-30.
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Rejuvenating Postcolonial African State
Implied in much of the foregoing is the fact that the rejuvenation of
the currently troubled and weakened postcolonial African state would
depend quite heavily on the extent to which it is righted and
accordingly restructured. As I have argued elsewhere, put summarily,
the argument in favour of rejuvenating the postcolonial African state
through its righting and restructuring is that an international legal
move from homogenization toward multinational statehood would
inhibit leaders in Africa from relying on the rules and norms of
international law in their bids to forcibly homogenize their states.5 °
African states would thus be encouraged by the new stance of the law
(which pays more heed to self-determination and minority rights) to
seek more peaceful means of securing their post-colonial borders and
population composition. 51 Referenda regarding the integrity of
African states, their structural organization, and the relationship
among their different sub-state groups might then become more
common and accepted. 52 And truly con-federal and federal structures
and practices may take far deeper root in more African countries.53
This would then lead to a reconfigured postcolonial African state that
is better able to avoid the structural tensions and consequent conflicts
that have characterized it since its very beginnings.
As this imperative task of righting, restructuring - and therefore
rejuvenating - the postcolonial African state is far too important
and consequential to be left to the affected states alone, and because of
other important reasons that will be discussed in the next section,
a suggestion is made in that section for the establishment of a
new mechanism that will focus on, facilitate and foster the kind of
state-building renaissance on the African continent that is hoped will
be generated by attempts to right and restructure the postcolonial
African state.
50 See Okafor (O.C.), "Martyrdom" supra note 7at 527.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
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4. Toward an AU Special Commission on National Minorities
How can the ongoing, if as yet very weak, trend toward the
righting, restructuring - and thus the rejuvenation - of the postcolonial
African state be facilitated, bolstered and sustained in order to prevent,
manage and even resolve many of the conflicts that afflict the
postcolonial African state? As we have seen, by writing self-
determination or minority rights norms into their constitutions and by
establishing federal and power-sharing state structures, a few African
states have begun - albeit mostly at a formal level - the effort to right,
restructure - and thus rejuvenate - the postcolonial African state. For
example, South Africa has established a Commission for the
Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and
Linguistic Communities;54 and Nigeria now operates a functional
Federal Character Commission. Yet, as important, necessary, and
commendable as these domestic efforts are, the structural crisis of
state legitimacy in Africa that has been generated by the national
minority problems that have afflicted the postcolonial African state
since its very beginnings is far too serious and far too key and
widespread as a source of conflict and violence on the continent to be
left entirely to the vagaries of domestic politics. As such, there is a
need for a meta-state mechanism to be devoted to the imperative and
urgent task of helping to rejuvenate the postcolonial African state via
its systematic righting and restructuring. The amelioration of so
central a statebuilding challenge as the national minority problem (and
attendant state legitimacy crisis) in Africa deserves the concerted
efforts of all interested parties on the continent. It certainly deserves
the attention of our continental institutions.
Aside from the seriousness of the state legitimacy crisis in Africa,
another reason that commends the establishment of such a meta-state
mechanism is the need to deploy relatively triadic structures in the
attempt to manage or resolve the national minority questions that have
led to the structural legitimacy crisis that afflicts the post-colonial
African state. By a triadic structure is meant the management or
54 See Section 181 of the Constitution of Republic of South Africa; and the First
Periodic Report of South Africa to the African Commission on Human and
Peoples'Rights, 2001 (submitted 2005) (on file with the author).
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adjudication of disputes by "a relatively detached and independent
third party."55 In contrast to a triadic model, a dyadic conflict
management structure is one that is limited to the parties to the dispute
themselves or to the parties and an institution that is controlled by one
of them. A good, and in fact common, example of such a dyadic
structure is a situation in which a dispute between a majority group
that extensively controls and dominates the central government of a
country and one of the minority groups in that country is referred to an
organ of that same central government. In the intensely multi-national
African state context, as elsewhere, where majority sub-state groups
often exert extensive control over the central government much to the
detriment of the minority groups, and where inter-group trust is - to
say the least - lacking, triadic structures (i.e. the injection of an
external institution or body as the central dispute manager or arbiter)
are likely to be significantly more effective than the inevitably dyadic
structures of the kinds of domestic mechanisms deployed toward the
management of inter-group tensions and conflict within such states.
This is because among the weaker sub-state groups within these states,
triadic dispute management mechanisms tend to inspire far more
confidence than dyadic models regarding the fairness - and therefore
the legitimacy - of the process of dispute management, and of its
outcomes. And since the very tensions and conflicts that are to be
subjected to dispute management tend to originate from a sense of
deprivation, unfair treatment, and being dominated, and are unlikely to
be doused or ameliorated when the dissatisfied minority or less
powerful sub-state group is not fully confident of the fairness and
legitimacy of the dispute management process and outcomes, it is only
reasonable to conclude that non-triadic dispute settlement models are
less likely to be effective in such circumstances. This much is
recognized in Tim Murithi's conclusion that: "There is therefore a
vital thirdparty role that the African Union [a meta-state institution]
can play in all future crisis situations on the continent, by intervening
in the tense situations before they escalate., 56
15 See Okafor (O.C.), "Entitlement" supra note 42 at 56.
56 See Murithi (T.), supra note 1. Emphasis supplied.
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Also embedded in Murithi's call for the deployment of more triadic
mechanisms toward the management of inter-group tensions and the
structural crisis of legitimacy that afflicts the postcolonial African
state is an expressed preference for the deployment of an inter-African
institution to do this job. Despite the budgetary difficulties that such
inter-African bodies often face, this is - in my view - the correct
posture to adopt. For, to be optimally effective, the proposed meta-
state mechanism must still be inter-African and "owned" by Africans.
It must not be perceived as a foreign body imposed on Africans by
those with whom Africa has not had a happy history of intervention.
This is largely because of the well-documented incidence of post-
colonial "immune reaction" within virtually every African state to
foreign, especially unilateral non-African interventions.57 The point
here is that far-too-many interventions fail on an African continent
that has only recently been decolonized largely because of their
perceived excessive foreignness and illegitimacy as somewhat
analogous to the colonial plunder and misrule of most African polities
by a few European states, many of whom continue to exert a
disproportionate level of power within non-African international
institutions.
As such, other than because of the budgetary problems that it often
faces, being the foremost inter-African institution of our time, the
African Union is well suited to host and provide the kind of
mechanism that is being suggested here. For one, the Constitutive Act
of the African Union recognizes the imperative "need to promote
peace, security and stability ' ' 58 in Africa. Clearly, there is no more
important way to promote peace, security and stability within Africa
than the effective management of the deep-seated and large scale
national minority problem that afflicts the postcolonial African state
through the preventive righting, restructuring - and eventual
rejuvenation - of that state. Secondly, since the African Charter on
51 See Deng (F.), "State Collapse: The Humanitarian Challenge to the United
Nations" in Zartman (I.W.) (ed.), Collapsed States: The Disintegration and
Restoration ofLegitimate Authority (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995) at 211.
58 See the Preamble of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, supra note 4.
On the identity and nature of the AU's institutions, See Udombana (N.J.),
"The Institutional Structure of the African Union: A Legal Analysis" (2002) 33
California Western International Law Journal 69.
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Human and Peoples' Rights, the African Commission on Human and
Peoples' Rights, and the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights
(the primary norms and processes relating to the vindication and
enjoyment of self-determination and minority rights in Africa) are all
AU institutions,59 the AU can help right the postcolonial African state
by facilitating the application of these norms in the domestic context.
Thirdly, as a relatively detached third party which enjoys significantly
greater legitimacy in Africa than other such international institutions,
the AU can play a key triadic and preventive role in ensuring the
fairness, legitimacy - and therefore effectiveness - of negotiated
attempts to restructure specific African states according to the dictates
of the relevant international norms, especially as mandated in the self-
determination and minority protection clauses of the African Charter.
It is in these ways that the AU can play a key role in the rejuvenation
of the postcolonial African state.
However, in order to be able to play this historic role effectively,
the AU ought to establish a new, dedicated, semi-autonomous
sub-institution that will be devoted to the national minority question
that has seriously troubled the postcolonial African state since its very
beginnings. Aside from the fact that a crisis that is so central and
consequential for Africa as the state legitimacy crisis (that has resulted
from the national minority problem) in most African states deserves
far more attention than it can get from any institution that multi-tasks
and is not focused on this one basket of issues, existing AU
institutions are simply not suitable for the task. Focused as it is on the
adjudication of legal disputes, the new African Court on Human and
Peoples' Rights is not equipped to serve as a preventive body and is
simply not suited to the intensely political task of attempting to douse
inter-group tensions within states well before they escalate into
conflicts. Although more of a political animal (if still quasi-judicial in
nature), the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights is
clearly more suited to reaction (in deciding cases brought before it)
than active direct intervention in tense situations as a way of
preventing conflict and violence. And although there is little that
59 For more on this point, see Murray (R.), Human Rights in Africa: From the OA U
to the African Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
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prevents it from developing its incipient preventive capacity, it is
better for it to focus on its more developed adjudicatory function.
What is more, the African Commission is already burdened with a
multitude of tasks to an extent that obstructs its ability to focus
squarely on the national minority question in Africa. This is of course
not to discount the ways in which both the African Court and the
African Commission can empower minority groups in Africa by
providing them with an avenue for highlighting their claims of
deprivation and oppression at the hands of majority groups and/or the
state. 60 As importantly, even though they are equipped with some
preventive capacity and charged t with the performance of some
preventive functions, other AU bodies such as the Assembly of Heads
of State and Government, the Executive Council, and the Peace and
Security Council are simply far too politicized or much too broadly
focused to perform fairly, legitimately, and effectively, the kind of
focused, dedicated and specialized function that is needed to tackle
squarely the national minority question in Africa. 61 The AU organ that
comes closest to fitting the bill here is the Peace and Security
Council.62 Upon its physical establishment in 2004, this council
replaced the defunct OAU/AU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention,
Management and Resolution. 63 Supported by the AU Commission,
a Panel of the Wise and a Continental Early Warning System, the
Peace and Security Council is an important avenue for AU preventive
and reactive action in the area of peace and security. However, this
Council is far too politicized and too broadly focused to serve the
purpose of ameliorating the national minorities' problem that is chief
source of Africa's state legitimacy crisis. In any case, it is instructive
60 See Murithi (T.), supra note 55 at 105.
61 For a description and analysis of the nature of these organs, see Udombana (N.J.),
"Unfinished Business" supra note 4 at 67-87.
62 See the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and
Security Council of the African Union, adopted on 9 July 2002,
in force since 26 December 2003, on-line: (http://www.africa-
union.org/root/au/organs/psc/protocolpeace%20and%20security.pdf) (visited
19 June 2006).
63 This mechanism was established in 1993 by the Cairo Declaration, OAU Doc.
AHG/Decl.3 (XXIX), 28-30 June 1993). It has been incorporated into the new
AU order by the Decision on the Implementation of the Sirte Summit Decision on
the African Union, OAU Doc. AHG/Decl.3 (XXXVII), 11 July 2001.
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that despite the fact that the Peace and Security Council has been in
existence since 2004, Tim Murithi - a keen observer of inter-African
politics - felt able to declare in 2005 that African statebuilding
practice has so far tended not to be preventive. If prevention rather
than reaction is the raison d'Otre of the proposed new institution, it is
clear that the existing conflict prevention mechanism has so far not
played, and is unlikely to play, that role effectively. It is for all of
these and other such reasons that I am of the view that, at the very
least, existing AU institutions need to be buttressed through the
creation of a new, specialized and dedicated institution.
Much in line with my earlier call for an OAU Special Commission
to undertake the same kind of tasks, it is proposed here that this new
body, this new dedicated, focused, and specialized preventive inter-
African institution, be styled the A U Special Commission on National
Minorities. Recognition of the necessity for the creation of this type of
avenue for the ventilation and management of sub-state group
(especially minority group) grievances within states is not new. For
instance, Gudmundur Alfredsson and Danilo Turk had long called on
states to allow such groups increased access to both international
policy-making and implementation bodies. 64  Similarly, Diane
Orentlicher has also called for "binding arbitration procedures" to
perform this kind of function. 65 More specifically, Tim Murithi has
recently urged the appointment of an AU Special Representative on
Peacebuilding, to perform somewhat similar, if broader, functions as
66the proposed special commission.
This proposed commission should be composed of five eminent
and influential African leaders (defined to include not just serving or
former heads of state), whose identities must reflect the geographical,
racial, religious, and gender diversity of the African continent. Such a
composition, and the semi-autonomous character of the commission,
would likely make it to be more effective than existing AU institutions
64 See Alfredsson (G.) and Turk (D.), "International Mechanisms for the
Monitoring and Protection of Minority Rights: Their Advantages, Disadvantages
and Interrelationships" in Bloed (A.), Leicht (L.), Nowak (M.) and Rosas (A.)
(eds.), Minority Human Rights in Europe: Comparing International Procedures
and Mechanisms (Dordrecht: Martinus Njhoff, 1993) at 181.
65 See Orentlicher (D.), supra note 34 at 74-77.
66 See Murithi (T.), supra note 1 at 109.
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at tackling the national minority question in Africa. The eminence and
moral authority of the five special commissioners would endow the
commission with a reasonable degree of influence on the relevant
African Governments. The fact that the commission is to be composed
of five eminent persons rather than a single commissioner has the
advantage of facilitating the greater institutionalization of its dispute
prevention/management process rather than its over-personalization.
This is an important feature given the struggle in many African states
to overcome their own unhappy postcolonial histories of personal rule,
and also given the need for the Commission's decisions to be
subjected to internal checks and balances. In this way will the
proposed Commission differ from the High Commissioner on
National Minorities established by the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).6 7 Furthermore, the autonomy of the
AU Special Commission from African states, and even from the main
political Organs of the AU, will also help bolster and cement its
triadic character, thus enhancing the perceived legitimacy of its
processes and decisions, and enhancing its effectiveness in the long
run. The Commission will also have the significant advantages of
specialist expertise, resulting from its dedication to a single basket of
related issues. Such expertise will be important if the commission is to
quickly become effective in tackling this central and devastating
problem of the postcolonial African state. Given how urgent and
imperative the resolution of the national minorities question is in
Africa, and how devastating to the continent its ill- or non-resolution
has been thus far, these advantages - no matter how slight they may
seem - are important nevertheless.
5. Conclusion:
In conclusion, I have argued that given the status of the nationality
minority problem that confronts the postcolonial African state as the
key cause of the state legitimacy crisis that confronts that state, and
given the fact that this structural legitimacy crisis that has afflicted
67 See Brenninkmeijer (0.), The OSCE High Commissioner on
National Minorities: Negotiating the 1992 Conflict Prevention Mandate
(Geneva: PSIO, 2005).
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almost all African states from their very beginnings is by far the
principal cause of high tensions, conflicts and violence on the
continent, it is Africa's key state-building challenge. As such, it
deserves far more focused and systematic attention from inter-African
institutions than it has so far received. I have also argued that in order
to rejuvenate the postcolonial African state, it must in effect be saved
from itself. It must be "righted" and restructured in accordance with
the increasing if still slight tendency in international law to pay
attention to minority rights and self-determination norms in the
conceptual ordering of state-formation and disaggregation.
It was thereafter suggested that if this process of righting and
restructuring - and therefore rejuvenating - the postcolonial African
state is to be facilitated, bolstered and sustained, the African Union
(AU) needs to - as a matter of urgency - appoint a Special
Commission on National Minorities to guide and order this process.
That this process must be allowed to happen and must be systematic
and preventive (rather than chaotic and reactive) is underlined by
Makau Mutua's accurate warning, with which I am in complete
agreement that over time the postcolonial African state will definitely
be reconfigured, and that the task is to as much as possible avoid
further violent reconfigurations of that state by preemptively finding
ways to allow its peaceable reconfiguration. It is hoped therefore that
this discussion has contributed, however modestly, to the search for
peaceable ways of reconfiguring and therefore ennobling the
postcolonial African state.
